# Wardrop Equilibrium

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• A set  $C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$  is *convex* iff

 $\forall x, y \in C, \quad \forall t \in [0, 1], \qquad tx + (1 - t)y \in C.$ 

- Intersection of convex sets is convex.
- A closed convex set *C* is equal to the intersection of all half-spaces containing it.

# Convex function

- The epigraph of a function  $f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$  is  $epi(f) := \{(x, t) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R} \mid t \ge f(x)\}.$
- The domain of a function f is  $\operatorname{dom}(f) := \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid f(x) < +\infty \right\}$
- The function *f* is said to be *convex* iff its epigraph is convex, in other words iff

 $\forall t \in [0,1], \qquad f(tx+(1-t)y) \leq tf(x)+(1-t)f(y).$ 

• The function f is said to be *strictly convex* iff  $\forall t \in (0,1), \quad f(tx + (1-t)y) < tf(x) + (1-t)f(y).$ 

# Convexity and differentiable

We assume sufficient regularity for the written object to exist.

- If  $f : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ .
  - f is convex iff f' non-decreasing.
  - If f' strictly increasing then f is strictly convex.
  - ۲
  - f is above its tangeants :  $f(y) \ge f(x) + f'(x)(y x)$ .
  - f is convex iff  $f'' \ge 0$ .
  - If f'' > 0 then f is strictly convex.
- If  $f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ 
  - f is convex iff  $\nabla f$  non-decreasing (i.e.  $(\nabla f(y) \nabla f(x)) \cdot (y x) \ge 0).$
  - f is above its tangeants :  $f(y) \ge f(x) + \nabla f(x)(y-x)$ .
  - f is convex iff  $\nabla^2 f(x) \succeq 0$  for all x.
  - If  $\nabla^2 f(x) \succ 0$  for all x then f is strictly convex.

## Video explanation

### https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qF0aDJfEa4Y



## Convex differentiable optimization problem

Consider the following optimization problem.

$\min_{x\in\mathbb{R}^n}$	f(x)	( <i>P</i> )
s.t.	$g_i(x) = 0$	$\forall i \in [n_E]$
	$h_j(x) \leq 0$	$\forall j \in [n_l]$

#### with

 $X := \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \forall i \in [n_E], \quad g_i(x) = 0, \quad \forall j \in [n_I], \quad h_j(x) \le 0\}.$ 

(P) is a convex optimization problem if f and X are convex.
(P) is a convex differentiable optimization problem if f, and h<sub>j</sub> (for j ∈ [n<sub>l</sub>]) are convex differentiable and g<sub>i</sub> (for i ∈ [n<sub>E</sub>]) are affine

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# KKT conditions

#### Theorem (KKT)

Let  $x^{\sharp}$  be an optimal solution to a differentiable optimization problem (P). If the constraints are qualified at  $x^{\sharp}$  then there exists optimal multipliers  $\lambda^{\sharp} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{E}}$  and  $\mu^{\sharp} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{l}}$  satisfying

$$\begin{cases} \nabla f(x^{\sharp}) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_{i}^{\sharp} \nabla g_{i}(x^{\sharp}) + \sum_{j=1}^{n_{i}} \mu_{i}^{\sharp} \nabla h_{j}(x^{\sharp}) = 0 & \text{first order condition} \\ g(x^{\sharp}) = 0 & \text{primal admissibility} \\ h(x^{\sharp}) \leq 0 & \text{dual admissibility} \\ \mu \geq 0 & \text{dual admissibility} \\ \mu_{i}h_{i}(x^{\sharp}) = 0, \quad \forall i \in [n_{i}] & \text{complementarity} \end{cases}$$

The three last conditions are sometimes compactly written

 $0\geq h(x^{\sharp})\perp \mu\geq 0.$ 

# Video explanation (at a later time)

Intro to constrained optimization
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwUV2IDLP8Q
Explaining tangeancy of multipliers
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuqB-d5MjZA
Marginal interpretation of multipliers
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-G3K2GPmEQ

# Slater condition

A convex optimization problem (*P*) satisfies the *Slater* condition if there exists a strictly admissible  $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^n$  that is

 $\forall i \in [n_E], \quad g_i(x_0) = 0, \quad \forall j \in [n_I], \quad h_j(x_0) < 0.$ 

If the Slater condition is satisfied, then the constraints are qualified at any  $x \in X$ .

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# Another optimality condition (convex case)

#### Theorem

If (P) is a convex differentiable optimization problem, then  $x^{\sharp} \in X$  is an optimal solution iff

 $\forall y \in X, \quad \nabla f(x) \cdot (y-x) \ge 0.$ 

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### The set-up

- G = (V, E) is a directed graph
- $x_e$  for  $e \in E$  represent the flux (number of people per hour) taking edge e
- $\ell_e : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}^+$  the cost incurred by a given user to take edge e
- We consider K origin-destination vertex pair {o<sup>k</sup>, d<sup>k</sup>}<sub>k∈[K]</sub>, such that there exists at least one path from o<sup>k</sup> to d<sup>k</sup>.
- $r_k$  is the rate of people going from  $o^k$  to  $d^k$
- $\mathcal{P}_k$  the set of all simple (i.e. without cycle) path form  $o^k$  to  $d^k$
- We denote  $f_p$  the flux of people taking path  $p \in \mathcal{P}_k$

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# Some physical relations

People going from  $o^k$  to  $d^k$  have to choose a path

People going through an edge are on a simple path taking this edge

 $r^k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}^k} f_p.$ 

$$x_e = \sum_{p \ni e} f_p.$$

The flux are non-negative

 $\forall p \in \mathcal{P}, \quad f_p \ge 0, \qquad \text{and} \qquad \forall e \in E, \quad x_e \ge 0$ 

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# System optimum problem

The system optimum consists in minimizing the sum of all costs over the admissible flux  $x = (x_e)_{e \in E}$ 

- Given x, the cost of taking edge e for one person is  $\ell_e(x_e)$ .
- The cost for the system for edge *e* is thus  $x_e \ell_e(x_e)$ .
- Thus minimizing the system costs consists in solving

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min_{x,f} & \sum_{e \in E} x_e \ell_e(x_e) & (SO) \\ s.t. & r_k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p & k \in [K] \\ & x_e = \sum_{p \ni e} f_p & e \in E \\ & f_p \ge 0 & p \in \mathcal{P} \end{array}$$

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s.t.  $r_k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p$   $k \in [K]$   
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- We can reformulate the (SO) problem only using path-intensity f = (f<sub>p</sub>)<sub>p∈P</sub>.
- Define  $x_e(f) := \sum_{p \ni e} f_p$ , and  $x = (x_e)_{e \in E}$ .
- Define the loss along a path  $\ell_p(f) = \sum_{e \in p} \ell_e(\sum_{\substack{p' \ni e \\ \chi_e(f)}} f_{p'})$
- The total cost is thus

$$C(f) = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p \ell_p(f) = \sum_{e \in E} x_e \ell_e(x_e(f)) = C(x(f)).$$

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$$C(f) = \sum_{\rho \in \mathcal{P}} f_{\rho} \ell_{\rho}(f) = \sum_{e \in E} x_e \ell_e(x_e(f)) = C(x(f)).$$

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# Path intensity problem

$$\min_{f} \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_{p} \ell_{p}(f)$$
(SO)  
s.t.  $r_{k} = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_{k}} f_{p}$   $k \in [K]$   
 $f_{p} \ge 0$   $p \in \mathcal{P}$ 

# Equilibrium definition

John Wardrop defined a traffic equilibrium as follows. "Under equilibrium conditions traffic arranges itself in congested networks such that all used routes between an O-D pair have equal and minimum costs, while all unused routes have greater or equal costs."

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A mathematical definition reads as follows.

Definition					
A user flow $f$ is a User Equilibrium if					
$\forall k \in [K],$	$\forall (\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{p}') \in \mathcal{P}_k^2,$	$f_p > 0 =$	$\Rightarrow  \ell_p(f) \leq \ell_{p'}(f).$		

# A new cost function

We are going to show that a user-equilibrium f is defined as a vector satisfying the KKT conditions of a certain optimization problem.

Let define a new edge-loss function by

$$L_e(x_e) := \int_0^{x_e} \ell_e(u) du.$$

The Wardrop potential is defined (for edge intensity) as

$$W(f) = W(x(f)) = \sum_{e \in E} L_e(x_e(f)).$$



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# User optimum problem

#### Theorem

A flow f is a user equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the first order KKT conditions of the following optimization problem

min <sub>x,f</sub>	W(x)	
s.t.	$r_k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p$	$k \in [K]$
	$x_e = \sum_{p \ni e} f_p$	<i>e</i> ∈ <i>E</i>
	$f_{p} \geq 0$	$\pmb{p}\in\mathcal{P}$



#### In path intensity formulation

$$\begin{split} \min_{f} & \sum_{e \in E} L_{e} \Big( \sum_{p \ni e} f_{p} \Big) \\ s.t. & r_{k} = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_{k}} f_{p} & k \in [K] \\ & f_{p} \ge 0 & p \in \mathcal{P} \end{split}$$

with Lagrangian

$$L(f,\lambda,\mu) := W(f) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \lambda_k \Big( r_k - \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p \Big) + \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \mu_p f_p.$$



#### In path intensity formulation

$$\min_{f} \qquad \sum_{e \in E} L_{e} \left( \sum_{p \ni e} f_{p} \right)$$

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Now note that we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial W}{\partial f_p}(f) &= \frac{\partial}{\partial f_p} \left( \sum_{e \in E} L_e(\sum_{p' \ni e} f_{p'}) \right) \\ &= \sum_{e \in p} \frac{\partial}{\partial x_e} L_e(x_e(f)) \\ &= \sum_{e \in p} \ell_e(x_e(f)) = \ell_p(f), \end{aligned}$$

Recall that  $L_e(x_e) := \int_0^{x_e} \ell_e(u) du$ .



The constraints of (UE) are qualified. First-order KKT conditions reads

 $\begin{cases} \frac{\partial L(f,\lambda,\mu)}{\partial f_p} = \ell_p(f) - \lambda_k + \mu_p = 0 \quad \forall p \in \mathcal{P}_k, \forall k \in \llbracket 1, K \rrbracket \\ \frac{\partial L(f,\lambda,\mu)}{\partial \lambda_k} = r_k - \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p = 0 \qquad \forall k \in \llbracket 1, K \rrbracket \\ \mu_p = 0 \text{ or } f_p = 0 \qquad \forall p \in \mathcal{P} \\ \mu_p \leq 0, f_p \geq 0 \qquad \forall p \in \mathcal{P} \end{cases}$ 

*f* satisfies the KKT conditions iff for all origin-destination pair  $k \in [K]$ , and all path  $p \in \mathcal{P}_k$  we have

$$\begin{cases} \ell_p(f) = \lambda_k & \text{ if } f_p > 0\\ \ell_p(f) \ge \lambda_k & \text{ if } f_p = 0 \end{cases}$$

In other words, if the path  $p \in \mathcal{P}_k$  is used, then its cost is  $\lambda_k$ , and all other path  $p' \in \mathcal{P}_i$  have a greater or equal cost, which is the definition of a User Equilibrium.

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### Convex case : equivalence

If the loss functions (in edge-intensity) are non-decreasing then the Wardrop potential W is convex.

#### Theorem

Assume that the loss function  $\ell_e$  are non-decreasing for all  $e \in E$ . Then there exists at least one user equilibrium, and a flow f is a user equilibrium if and only if it solves (UE)

Proof : the cost is convex as composition of convex and affine functions, thus KKT is a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality.



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### Convex case : characterization

define the system cost of a flow f for a given flow f', as

$$C^{f'}(f) := \sum_{e \in E} x_e(f) \ell_e(x_e(f')).$$

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#### Theorem

Assume that the cost functions  $\ell_e$  are continuous and non-decreasing. Then,  $f^{UE}$  is a user equilibrium iff

$$\forall f \in F^{ad}, \qquad C^{f^{UE}}(f^{UE}) \leq C^{f^{UE}}(f),$$

where  $F^{ad}$  is the set of admissible flows.

By convexity  $(f^{UE})$  is an optimal solution to (UE) iff

 $abla W(f^{UE}) \cdot (f - f^{UE}) \ge 0, \quad \forall f \in F^{ad}$ 

which is equivalent to



which can be written

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# Definition

#### Definition

Consider increasing loss functions  $\ell_e$ . Let  $f^{UE}$  be a user equilibrium, and  $f^{SO}$  be a system optimum. Then the price of anarchy of our network is given by

$$PoA := \frac{C(f^{UE})}{C(f^{SO})} \ge 1.$$

#### Theorem

Let  $\ell_e$  be the affine function  $x_e \mapsto b_e x_e + c_e$ , with  $b_e, c_e \ge 0$ . Then the price of anarchy is lower than 4/3, and the bound is tight.

Let f be a feasible flow, and  $f^{UE}$  be the user equilibrium. For ease of notation we fix  $x^{UE} = x(f^{UE})$ , and x = x(f). By Theorem we have

$$C(f^{UE}) \leq C^{f^{UE}}(f)$$

$$= \sum_{e \in E} (b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e) x_e$$

$$\leq \sum_{e \in E} \left[ (b_e x_e + c_e) x_e + \frac{1}{4} b_e (x_e^{UE})^2 \right] \quad \text{as } (x_e - x_e^{UE}/2)^2 \geq 0$$

$$\leq C(f) + \frac{1}{4} \sum_{e \in E} (b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e) x_e^{UE} \quad \text{as } c_e x_e^{UE} \geq 0$$

$$= C(f) + \frac{1}{4} C^{f^{UE}}(f^{UE})$$

Hence we have  $3/4C(f^{UE}) \le C(f)$ . Minimizing over admissible flow f ends the proof.

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 $C(f^{UE}) \leq C^{f^{UE}}(f)$   $= \sum_{e \in E} (b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e) x_e$   $\leq \sum_{e \in E} \left[ (b_e x_e + c_e) x_e + \frac{1}{4} b_e (x_e^{UE})^2 \right] \quad \text{as } (x_e - x_e^{UE}/2)^2 \geq 0$   $\leq C(f) + \frac{1}{4} \sum_{e \in E} (b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e) x_e^{UE} \quad \text{as } c_e x_e^{UE} \geq 0$   $= C(f) + \frac{1}{4} C^{f^{UE}}(f^{UE})$ 

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# Pigou's Example



Figure: Pigou example

On a graph with two nodes: one origin, one destination, a total flow of 1, a fixed cost of 1 on one edge, and a cost of  $x^N$  on the other, where  $N \in \mathbb{N}$  and x is the intensity of the flow using this edge (see Figure 1).

- Compute the system optimum for a given N.
- **2** Compute the user equilibrium for a given N.
- § Compute the price of anarchy on this network when  $N \to \infty$ .

### Exercise for next week (3.2)

Consider a (finite) directed, strongly connected, graph G = (V, E). We consider K origin-destination vertex pair  $\{o^k, d^k\}_{k \in [K]}$ , such that there exists at least one path from  $o^k$  to  $d^k$ . We want to find bounds on the price of anarchy, assuming that, for each arc e,  $\ell_e : \mathbb{R}^+ \to \mathbb{R}^+$  is non-decreasing, and that we have

 $x\ell_e(x) \leq \gamma L_e(x), \qquad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^+$ 

- Secall which optimization problems solves the social optimum  $x^{SO}$  and the user equilibrium  $x^{UE}$ .
- 2 Let x be a feasable vector of arc-intensity. Show that  $W(x) \le C(x) \le \gamma W(x)$ .
- Show that the price of anarchy  $C(x^{UE})/C(x^{SO})$  is lower than  $\gamma$ .
- If the cost per arc l<sub>e</sub> are polynomial of order at most p with non-negative coefficient, find a bound on the price of anarchy. Is this bound sharp?

# Further video content

This is a research seminar by one of the expert in the domain. The first half is very interesting to get a better intuition of the concepts. The second half is more dedicated to the proof of the result presented in the talk.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e30\_tMsN2t8