

Operation Research and Transport

Braess's Paradox

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What will this course be about?

- Understanding how people choose their way through a transportation network.
- having an idea on how to compute efficiently :
 - the shortest path on a network
 - the equilibrium on a network
- A practical work to compute this equilibrium on a computer
- Snapshots of other problems

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- 1 Urban Transportation Network Analysis
- 2 Showcasing an example of Braess Paradox

Transportation Planning Process

- 1 Organization and definition
- 2 Base year inventory
- 3 Model analysis
 - 1 trip generation
 - 2 trip distribution
 - 3 modal split
 - 4 traffic assignement
- 4 Travel forecast
- 5 Network evaluation

Urban Transportation Network Analysis

Input of the analysis:

- transportation infrastructure and services (street, intersections...)
- transportation system and control policies
- demand for travel.

Two-stage analysis:

- First stage: determining the congestion, i.e. calculating the flow through each component of the network.
- Second stage : computing measure of interests according to the flow.
 - travel time and costs,
 - revenue and profit of ancilliary services,
 - welfare measures (accessibility, equity),
 - flow by-products (pollution, change in land-value)...

Why do we need a system approach?

- Some decisions could be taken according to local measures. For example, traffic lights can be timed according to data on current usual traffic at the intersection.
- However, most decisions will impact the travel time / comfort. Hence, some people will adapt their usual transit route.
- Consequently, the congestion on the network will change, changing time / comfort of other parts of the system and inducing other people to adapt their path...
- After some time these ripple effects will lessen, and the system will reach a new equilibrium.

Equilibrium in Markets

- For a given product, in a perfectly competitive market we have:
 - a production function giving the number of products companies are ready to make for a given price;
 - a demand function giving the number of product consumers are ready to buy for a given price.
- In some cases, especially in transportation, the price is not the only determinant factor. Regularity, fiability, ease of use and comfort are other determinant factor.
- In the remaining of the course we will be speaking of costs of each path, the cost factoring in all of these factors.

Nash Equilibrium : Prisoner's Dilemma

Two guys got caught while dealing chocolates. As he is missing hard evidence the judge offers them a deal.

- If both deny their implication they will get 2 months each.
- If one speaks, and the other denies, the first will get 1 month while the other will get 5 months.
- If both speak they get 4 months each.

Question: what is the equilibrium?

Nash Equilibrium

- In game theory we consider multiple agents $a \in \mathcal{A}$, each having a set of possible action $u_a \in \mathcal{U}_a$.
- Each agent earn a reward $r_a(u)$ depending on his action, as well as the other actions.
- A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a set of actions $\{u_a\}_{a \in \mathcal{A}}$, such that no player can increase his reward by changing his action if the other keeps these actions :

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \quad \forall u'_a \in \mathcal{U}_a, \quad r_a(u'_a, u_{-a}) \leq r_a(u_a, u_{-a}).$$

- A recommendation can be followed only if it is a Nash Equilibrium.

Game Theory : a few classes

- Number of player
 - 2 (most results)
 - $n > 2$ (hard, even with 3)
 - an infinity.
- Objective
 - zero-sum game (e.g. chess)
 - cooperative: everybody shares the same objective (e.g. pandemia)
 - generic (e.g. Prisonner dilemna)

Game theory : a few definitions

Definition

A **Nash equilibrium** is a set of actions such that no player can unilaterally improve its pay-off by changing his action.

Definition

A **Pareto efficient solution** is a set of actions such that no other set of actions can strictly improve at least one player pay-off without decreasing at least another.

Definition

A **social optimum** is a set of actions maximizing the pay-off average.

Exercises :

- What about Prisoner's Dilemma?
- What about Zero Sum games?

Exercise: A beautiful mind

A beautiful mind : <https://youtu.be/a9k4UJrCdKg>

- Is the solution proposed by Nash a Nash equilibrium?
- Is the solution proposed by Nash a Pareto Optimum?
- Is the solution proposed by “Smith” a Nash equilibrium?
- Is the solution proposed by “Smith” a Pareto Optimum?
- Any other suggestion?

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
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Game theory in road network

- People choose their means of transport (e.g. car versus public transport), their time of departure and their itinerary.
- Each user chooses in his own interest (mainly the shortest time / lowest cost).
- The time depends on the congestion, which means on the choice of other users.
- Hence, we are in a game framework: users interact with conflicting interests.


A very simple framework

- Consider a large group of persons who want to go from the same origin o to the destination d , at the same time, with the same car.
- We look at a very simple graph with two roads, each composed of two edges.
- The time on each edge of the road is given as a function of the number of persons taking the given edge.




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
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Total time : 1.5


Adding a road

- Now someone decides to construct a new, very efficient road with cost 0.
- What is the new equilibrium?




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Adding a road

- Now someone decides to construct a new, very efficient road with cost 0.
- What is the new equilibrium?
- Notice that the time for every user has increased! This is the **price of anarchy**.



Total time : 2

Another explanation

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZiauQXIKs3U> (7')

And a physical demonstration:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMrYlspifuo>

Definitions snapshot

On this example we can compare :

- User Equilibrium (UE), with global cost 2
- System Optimum (SO), with global cost 1.5
- price of anarchy: $4/3$.

Definition

A Wardrop (User) Equilibrium, is a repartition of flow such that no single user can improve its cost (travel time) by unilaterally changing routes.

Real case examples

- 42d Street of New York. ([New York Times, 25/12/1990](#)).
- Stuttgart 1969 (a newly built road was closed again), [Seoul 2003](#) (6 lanes highway was turned into a park).
- New York 2009 (closed some places with success)
- In 2008, researchers found roads in Boston and NYC that should be closed to diminish traffic.
- Steinberg and Zangwill showed that Braess paradox is more or less as likely to occur as not.
- [Rapoport's experiment \(2009\)](#):
 - A group of 18 students is presented with the problem of repetively (40 times) choosing its road on the graph, earning money for the experiment: fastest meaning more money.
 - Then the graph is modified (either by adding the 0 cost road, or retiring it).
 - Conclusion: after a few iterations the observed repartition is close to the theoretical one with some oscillations.
 - Then tested on a bigger network.

Exercise

- Two nodes : a and b
- Two edges : (from a to b): 1 and 2
- Total number of trips: 1000
- Costs : $c_1(x_1) = 5 + 2x_1$, $c_2(x_2) = 10 + x_2$.
- Question: what is the repartition of the trips along the two edges?
- Same question with $c_1(x_1) = 15(1 + 0.15(\frac{x_1}{1000})^4)$,
 $c_2(x_2) = 20(1 + 0.15(\frac{x_2}{3000})^4)$?

Another Nash Equilibrium: Split or Steal

The prisoner's dilemma has been used as the final part of TV game show called "split or steal".

The rules :

- The two remaining contestants have a certain amount of money M .
- They each have to choose "split" or "steal"
- If both "split" they each get half: $M/2$.
- If one "steal" while the other "split", the stealing one gets M and the other 0 .
- If they both "steal" they get nothing.

Here is an example:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yM38mRHY150&list=PLq4_sHebc4IWI2VQnqaKXf0YXEj88jck0&index=5

Here is a very nice example of why reality is more complex than math: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8>