Computing risk averse equilibrium in incomplete market

Vincent Leclère Henri Gerard, Andy Philpott

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Uncertainty on electricity market

- Today, wholesale electricity markets takes the form of an auction that matches supply and demand.
- But, the demand cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. These day-ahead markets must be augmented with balancing markets.
- To reduce *CO*₂ emissions and increase the penetration of renewables, there are increasing amounts of electricity from intermittent sources such as wind and solar.
- That's why equilibrium on the market are set in a stochastic setting.

Multiple equilibrium in a incomplete market

- In Philpott et al. (2013), the authors present a framework for multistage stochastic equilibria.
- They show that equilibrium in risk-neutral market and equilibrium in complete risk averse markets can be found as solution of a global optimization problem.
- What about risk averse equilibrium in incomplete market ?
- We present a toy problem with agreable properties (strong concavity of utility) that displays multiple equilibrium.
- We show that the classical methods used to find equilibrium (PATH solver and tatônnement's algorithms) fail to find all equilibria.

Outline

Statement of the problem

- Social planner problem (Optimization problem)
- Equilibrium problem
- Trading risk with Arrow-Debreu securities
- 2 Optim. and equilibrium problems
 - In the risk neutral case
 - In the risk averse case
- 3 Multiple risk averse equilibrium
 - Numerical results
 - Analytical results

Ingredients of the problem




Figure: Illustration of the toy problem

- Two time-step market
- One good traded
- Two agents: producer and consumer
- Finite number of scenario $\omega \in \Omega$
- Consumption on second stage only

Producer and consumer welfare

Producer Welfare

- Step 1: production of x at a marginal cost cx
- Step 2: random production \mathbf{x}_r at uncertain marginal cost $\mathbf{c}_r \mathbf{x}_r$



Consumer Welfare

cons

- Step 1: no consumption ∅
- Step 2: random consumption y at marginal utility $\mathbf{V}-\mathbf{ry}$

$$\underbrace{\boldsymbol{W}_{c}(\omega)}_{\text{sumer's welfare}} = \underbrace{0}_{\text{step 1}} + \underbrace{\boldsymbol{V}(\omega)\boldsymbol{y}(\omega) - \frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{r}(\omega)\boldsymbol{y}(\omega)^{2}}_{\text{consumer's utility at step 2}}$$

Social planner problem (Optimization problem)

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Social planner problem (Optimization problem)

Social planner's welfare

The welfare of the social planner can be defined by




Where

•
$$\boldsymbol{W}_{p}(\omega) = \frac{1}{2}cx^{2} - \frac{1}{2}\mathbf{c}_{r}(\omega)\mathbf{x}_{r}(\omega)^{2}$$

•
$$W_c(\omega) = V(\omega)y(\omega) - \frac{1}{2}r(\omega)y(\omega)^2$$

Social planner problem (Optimization problem)

Optimization and uncertainty



To be able to do optimization, we aggregate uncertainty using:

- the expectation $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}$: risk neutral
- a risk measure F: risk averse

Figure: Aggregating uncertainty with a risk measure to obtain real value

Social planner problem (Optimization problem)

Social planner problem

Given a probability distribution \mathbb{P} on Ω , we can define a risk neutral social planner problem

RNSP(\mathbb{P}): $\max_{x,x_r,y} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[W_{sp}]}_{\text{expected welfare}}$ s.t. $\underbrace{x + \mathbf{x}_r(\omega)}_{\text{supply}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{y}(\omega)}_{\text{demand}}$ Given a risk measure \mathbb{F} , we can define a risk averse social planner problem

 $\begin{array}{c} \operatorname{RASP}(\mathbb{F}):\\ \underset{x,x_{r},y}{\max} \quad \underbrace{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{W}_{sp}]}_{\text{risk adjusted welfare}} \end{array}$

s.t.





Social planner problem (Optimization problem)

Risk measures

• We consider coherent risk measures, with

 $\mathbb{F}[\mathbf{Z}] = \min_{\mathbb{Q}\in\mathbb{Q}}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[\mathbf{Z}].$

- If Q is a polyhedron defined by K extreme points (Q_k)_{k∈[1;K]}, then F is said to be polyhedral with
 F[Z] = min_{Q1,...,QK} E_{Qk}[Z].
- In this case RASP can be written

$$\begin{array}{ll} \max_{\theta, x, \mathbf{x}_{r}, \mathbf{y}} & \theta \\ \text{s.t.} & \theta \leq \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{k}} [\boldsymbol{W}_{sp}] , \ \forall k \in \llbracket 1; K \rrbracket \\ & x + \mathbf{x}_{r}(\omega) = \mathbf{y}(\omega) , \ \forall \omega \in \Omega \end{array}$$

Social planner problem (Optimization problem)

Remark on non linearity of risk averse social planner

• Linearity of expectation leads to equalities

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[\boldsymbol{W}_{sp}] = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[\boldsymbol{W}_{p} + \boldsymbol{W}_{c}]}_{\text{expectation of sum}} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[\boldsymbol{W}_{p}] + \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[\boldsymbol{W}_{c}]}_{\text{sum of expectations}}$$

• With a general risk measure

$$\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{W}_{sp}] = \underbrace{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{W}_{p} + \boldsymbol{W}_{c}]}_{\text{risk of sum}} \neq \underbrace{\mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{W}_{p}] + \mathbb{F}[\boldsymbol{W}_{c}]}_{\text{sum of risks}}$$

• There is no natural criterion for a risk averse social planner

Equilibrium problem

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Equilibrium problem

Agent are price takers

Definition

An agent is *price taker* if she acts as if she has no influence on the price.

In the remain of the presentation, we consider that agents are price takers.

Equilibrium problem

Definition risk neutral equilibrium

Definition (Arrow and Debreu (1954))

Given a probability \mathbb{P} on Ω , a risk neutral equilibrium RNEQ(\mathbb{P}) is a set of prices $\{\boldsymbol{\pi}(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\}$ such that there exists a solution to the system

RNEQ(P):
$$\max_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{x}_r} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}} \left[\mathbf{W}_p + \boldsymbol{\pi} \left(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}_r \right) \right]}_{\text{expected profit}}$$
$$\underbrace{\max_{\mathbf{y}} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}} \left[\mathbf{W}_c - \boldsymbol{\pi} \mathbf{y} \right]}_{\text{expected utility}}$$
$$\underbrace{\mathbf{0} \le \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}_r(\omega) - \mathbf{y}(\omega) \perp \boldsymbol{\pi}(\omega) \ge \mathbf{0}}_{\text{market clears}}, \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega$$

Equilibrium problem

Remark on complementarity constraints

Complementarity constraints are defined by

 $0 < x + \mathbf{x}_r(\omega) - \mathbf{y}(\omega) \perp \pi(\omega) > 0$, $\forall \omega \in \Omega$

- If $\pi > 0$ then supply = demand
- If $\pi = 0$ then supply > demand

Equilibrium problem

Consumer is risk insensitive

As the consumer has no first stage decision, she can optimize each scenario independently

$$\begin{array}{l} \max_{\mathbf{y}} \quad \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}[\mathbf{W}_{c} - \pi \mathbf{y}]}_{\text{expected utility}} \\ \forall \omega \in \Omega \,, \ \max_{\mathbf{y}(\omega)} \quad \underbrace{\mathbf{W}_{c}(\omega) - \pi(\omega)\mathbf{y}(\omega)}_{\text{scenario independent}} \end{array}$$

Equilibrium problem

Definition of risk averse equilibrium

Definition


Given two risk measures \mathbb{F}_p and \mathbb{F}_c , a risk averse equilibrium $RAEQ(\mathbb{F}_p, \mathbb{F}_c)$ is a set of prices $\{\pi(\omega) : \omega \in \Omega\}$ such that there exists a solution to the system

RAEQ(
$$\mathbb{F}_{p}, \mathbb{F}_{c}$$
):
$$\max_{x, x_{r}} \underbrace{\mathbb{F}_{p} \Big[W_{p} + \pi (x + x_{r}) \Big]}_{\text{risk adjusted profit}}$$
$$\max_{\mathbf{y}} \underbrace{\mathbb{F}_{c} \big[W_{c} - \pi \mathbf{y} \big]}_{\text{risk adjusted consumption}}$$
$$\underbrace{0 \le x + x_{r}(\omega) - \mathbf{y}(\omega) \perp \pi(\omega) \ge 0}_{\text{market clears}}, \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega$$

Equilibrium problem

Consumer is insensitive to the choice of risk measure

Assuming that the risk measure \mathbb{F}_c of the consumer is monotonic, she can optimize scenario per scenario



Equilibrium problem

Risk averse equilibrium with polyhedral risk measure

If the risk measure \mathbb{F} is polyhedral, then $RAEQ(\mathbb{F})$ reads

RAEQ: $\max_{\substack{\theta, x, \mathbf{x}_r \\ \theta, x, \mathbf{x}_r }} \quad \theta$ s.t. $\theta \leq \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_k} [\mathbf{W}_p + \mathbf{\pi} (x + \mathbf{x}_r)] , \quad \forall k \in \llbracket 1; K \rrbracket$ $\max_{\mathbf{y}(\omega)} \quad \mathbf{W}_c(\omega) - \mathbf{\pi} \mathbf{y}(\omega) , \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega$ $0 \leq x + \mathbf{x}_r(\omega) - \mathbf{y}(\omega) \perp \mathbf{\pi}(\omega) \geq 0 , \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega$

Trading risk with Arrow-Debreu securities

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Trading risk with Arrow-Debreu securities

Definition of an Arrow-Debreu security

Definition

An Arrow-Debreu security for node $\omega \in \Omega$ is a contract that charges a price $\mu(\omega)$ in the first stage, to receive a payment of 1 in scenario ω .




Figure: Representation of two Arrow-Debreu securities with two scenarii

Trading risk with Arrow-Debreu securities

Risk averse equilibrium with risk trading

A risk trading equilibrium is sets of prices $\{\pi(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\}$ and $\{\mu(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\}$ such that there exists a solution to the system:

RAEQ-AD:
$$\max_{\theta, x, \mathbf{x}_r} \quad \theta - \sum_{\substack{\omega \in \Omega \\ \text{cost of contracts purchased}}} \mu(\omega) \mathbf{a}(\omega)$$

s.t.
$$\theta \leq \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_k} \left[\mathbf{W}_p + \boldsymbol{\pi}(x + \mathbf{x}_r) + \mathbf{a} \right], \quad \forall k \in \llbracket 1; K \rrbracket$$

$$\begin{split} \max_{\phi, \mathbf{y}} & \phi - \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \mu(\omega) \mathbf{b}(\omega) \\ \text{s.t.} & \phi \leq \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_k} \left[\mathbf{W}_c - \mathbf{\pi} \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{b} \right], \ \forall k \in \llbracket 1; K \rrbracket \end{split}$$

$$egin{aligned} 0 &\leq x + \mathbf{x}_r(\omega) - \mathbf{y}(\omega) \perp \pi(\omega) \geq 0 \;, \;\; orall \omega \in \Omega \ 0 &\leq -\mathbf{a}(\omega) - \mathbf{b}(\omega) \perp \mu(\omega) \geq 0 \;, \;\; orall \omega \in \Omega \ ^* ext{supply} \geq ext{demand}^* \end{aligned}$$

Trading risk with Arrow-Debreu securities


Conclusion

Until now, we have seen

- social planner's problem in risk neutral and risk averse setting
- equilibrium problem in risk neutral and risk averse setting
- risk trading equilibrium problem in risk averse setting We will study the link between
 - risk neutral social planner and equilibrium problem (RNSP and RNEQ)
 - risk averse social planner and risk trading equilibrium (RASP and RAEQ-AD)

In the risk neutral case





Optim. and equilibrium problems
In the risk neutral case
In the risk averse case



In the risk neutral case

RNSP is equivalent to RNEQ

Proposition

Let \mathbb{P} be a probability measure over Ω . The elements $(x^* \mathbf{x}_r^*, \mathbf{y}_r^*)$ are optimal solutions to $RNSP(\mathbb{P})$ if and only if there exist (non trivial) equilibrium prices π for RNEQ(P) with associated optimal controls $(x^*, \mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{y}^*)$

Corollary

If producer's criterion and consumer's criterion are strictly concave, then $RNSP(\mathbb{P})$ admits a unique solution and $RNEQ(\mathbb{P})$ admits a unique equilibrium.

In the risk averse case





- Optim. and equilibrium problemsIn the risk neutral case
 - In the risk averse case
- 3 Multiple risk averse equilibrium

In the risk averse case

RAEQ-AD is equivalent to RASP

We adapt a result of Ralph and Smeers (2015)

Proposition

Suppose given equilibrium prices π and μ such that the finite valued vector $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_r, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \theta, \varphi)$ solves RAEQ-AD(F). Then π are equilibrium price for $RNEQ(\mu)$ with optimal value vector $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_r, \mathbf{y})$. Moreover, $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_r, \mathbf{y})$ solves $RASP(\mathbb{F})$ where μ is the worst case probability.

The reverse holds true

In the risk averse case

Summing up equivalences

We have shown two equivalences

 $\operatorname{RNSP}(\mathbb{P}) \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{RNEQ}(\mathbb{P})$, $RASP(\mathbb{F}) \Leftrightarrow RAEQ-AD(\mathbb{F})$, complete market

(risk neutral setting) (risk averse setting)

that lead to result about uniqueness of equilibrium and methods of decomposition

 What can we say about RAEQ(F ?

incomplete market

•••••••

Numerical results

Outline



- 2 Optim. and equilibrium problems
- 3 Multiple risk averse equilibrium
 - Numerical results
 - Analytical results

Numerical results

Recall on the problem




Figure: Illustration of the toy problem

Recall:

- 2 time-step market
- I good traded
- 2 agents : 1 consumer, 1 producer
- Consumption on second stage only We focus on:
 - 2 scenarios ω_1 and ω_2
 - 2 prices: π_1 and π_2
 - 5 controls: x_1, x_2, y_1 and y_2
 - 2 probabilities (p, 1-p) and $(\bar{p}, 1-\bar{p})$
 - $p = \frac{1}{4}, \ \bar{p} = \frac{3}{4}$
 - prices $0 < \pi_1 < \pi_2$

Numerical results

Computing an equilibrium with GAMS

- GAMS with the solver PATH in the EMP framework. (See Britz et al. (2013), Brook et al. (1988), Ferris and Munson (2000) and Ferris et al. (2009))
- different starting points defined by a grid 100×100 over the square $[1.220; 1.255] \times [2.05; 2.18]$
- We find one equilibrium defined by

 $\pi = (\pi_1, \pi_2) = (1.23578; 2.10953)$

Numerical results

Walras's tâtonnement algorithm

Then we compute the equilibrium using a tâtonnement algorithm.

Data: MAX-ITER, $(\pi_1^0, \pi_2^0), \tau$ **Result:** A couple (π_1^*, π_2^*) which approximates the equilibrium price π_{\sharp} for k from 0 to MAX-ITER do 1 Compute an optimal decision for each player given a price : 2 x, $x_1, x_2 = \arg \max \mathbb{E}[W_p + \pi(x + \mathbf{x}_r)];$ 3 $y(\omega) = \arg \max \mathbb{F}[W_{c} - \pi \mathbf{y}];$ 4 Update the price : 5 $\pi_1 = \pi_1 - \tau \max \{0; y_1 - (x + x_1)\};$ 6 $\pi_2 = \pi_2 - \tau \max \{0; y_2 - (x + x_2)\};$ 7 8 end 9 return (π_1, π_2)

Algorithm 1: Walras' tâtonnement

Numerical results

Computing equilibria with Walras's tâtonnement

 Running Walras's tâtonnement algorithm starting from (1.25; 2.06), respectively from (1.22; 2.18), with 100 iterations and a step size of 0.1, we find two new equilibria


 $\pi = (1.2256; 2.0698)$ and $\pi = (1.2478; 2.1564)$

 An alternative tatônnement method called FastMarket (see Facchinei and Kanzow (2007)) find the same equilibria

Numerical results

Summing up about computing equilibrium

	Equilibrium prices	Risk adjusted welfares
red (Tâtonnement)	(1.2478; 2.1564)	(2.113; 0.845)
blue (GAMS)	(1.2358; 2.1095)	(2.134; 0.821)
green (Tâtonnement)	(1.2256; 2.0698)	(2.152; 0.798)



 No equilibrium dominates any other

Analytical results

Outline



2 Optim. and equilibrium problems



Analytical results


Introduction Statement of the problem Optim. and equilibrium problems

Multiple risk averse equilibrium Conclusion

Analytical results

Optimal control of agents with respect to a price π

There are three regimes






Figure: Illustration of the three regimes

Table: Optimal control for producer and consumer problems

where
$$x_c(\boldsymbol{\pi}) = \frac{1}{2(\pi_1 - \pi_2)} \left(\frac{\pi_2^2}{2c_2} - \frac{\pi_1^2}{2c_1} \right)$$

Analytical results

Excess production function

We are now looking for prices (π_1, π_2) such that the complementarity constraints are satisfied

$$z_i(\pi) = \underbrace{x^{\sharp}(\pi) + x_i^{\sharp}(\pi) - y_i^{\sharp}(\pi) = 0}_{i \in \{1, 2\}}, \quad i \in \{1, 2\}$$

market clears for optimal control

This excess functions have three regime. In the green and red part the equation is linear, in the blue part the equation is guadratic.

Analytical results

Representation of analytical solutions (scenario 1)




Figure: Null excess function per scenario manifold

Analytical results

Representation of analytical solutions (scenario 2)




Figure: Null excess function per scenario manifold

Analytical results

Representation of analytical solutions (red equilibrium)




Figure: Null excess function per scenario manifold

Analytical results

Representation of analytical solutions (blue equilibrium)




Figure: Null excess function per scenario manifold

Analytical results

Representation of analytical solutions (green equilibrium)




Figure: Null excess function per scenario manifold

Analytical results

Some interesting remarks

Remark

The PATH solver find the blue equilibrium, while the tatônnements methods find equilibrium green and red. The blue equilibrium is unstable, i.e. $\pi' = z(\pi)$ is unstable around the blue equilibrium.

Remark

There exists a set of non-zero measure of parameters $V_1, V_2, c, c_1, c_2, r_1$, and r_2 (albeit small), that have three distinct equilibrium with the same properties.

Remark

We can show that the blue equilibrium is a convex combination of red and green equilibrium.

Analytical results

Stability of equilibriums (red equilibrium)




Figure: Representation of vector field $\pi' = z(\pi)$ around green equilibrium

Analytical results

Stability of equilibriums (blue equilibrium)




Figure: Representation of vector field $\pi' = z(\pi)$ around green equilibrium

Analytical results

Stability of equilibriums (green equilibrium)




Figure: Representation of vector field $\pi' = z(\pi)$ around green equilibrium

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Analytical results

Stability of equilibriums (vector field)




Figure: Representation of vector field $\pi' = z(\pi)$ around green equilibrium

Conclusion

In this talk we have

- shown an equivalence between risk averse social planner problem and risk trading equilibrium (respectively risk neutral equivalence)
- given theorems of uniqueness of equilibrium
- shown non uniqueness of equilibrium in risk averse setting without Arrow-Debreu securities

On going work

- Does the counter example extend with multiple agents and scenarios ?
- Do we have uniqueness with bounds on the number of Arrow-Debreu securities exchanged ?

If you want to know more...

Just ask some questions



or have a look at

https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.08398

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